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Enforcing U.S. Excessive and Punitive
Damages Awards in Germany
Recognition and enforcement of U.S. excessive damages awards, especially
punitive damages awards, has recently become a much debated topic in Germany.
At least five important judgments have emerged during the past five years, accom-
panied by an increase of German and American law review commentary.' In
1989, the Landgericht Berlin (District Court of Berlin) denied recognition of a
Massachusetts award of $275,000 for pain and suffering and loss of earnings due
to an industrial accident at a machine manufactured by the German defendant.'
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1. See, e.g., Ernst C. Stiefel, Rolf Stmirner, & Astrid Stradler, The Enforceability of Excessive
U.S. Punitive Damage Awards in Germany, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 779 (1991); Kurt Siehr, Zur
Anerkennung und Vollstreckung auslandischer Verurteilungen zu "punitive damages, "37 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 705 (1991); Joachim Zekoll, Recognition and Enforcement of
American Products Liability Awards in the Federal Republic of Germany, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301
(1989); Klaus J. Beucher & John B. Sandage, United States Punitive Damage Awards in German
Courts: The Evolving German Position on Service and Enforcement, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
967 (1991); Ernest C. Stiefel & Rolf Stiirner, Die Vollstreckbarkeit US-amerikanischer Schadenser-
satzurteile exzessiver HOhe, 38 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [VEasR] 829 (1987); Friedrich Graf von
Westphalen, "Punitive Damages " in US-amerikanischen Produkthaftungsklagen und der Vorbehalt
des Art. 12 EGBGB, 27 RIW 141 (1981); Rolf A. Schfitze, The Recognition and Enforcement of
American Civil Judgments Containing Punitive Damages in the Federal Republic of Germany, 11 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 581 (1990); Rolf A. Schiitze, Die Anerkennung und Vollstreckbarerklarung
US-amerikanischer Schadenersatzurteile in Produkthaftungssachen in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, in FESTSCHRiFr HEINRICH NAGEL 392 (1987) [hereinafter FESTSCHnFr H. NAGEL]. See gener-
ally Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1988).
2. Judgment of June 13, 1989, 35 RIW 988 (1989); Re the Enforcement of a U.S. Judgment,
3 INT'L LITIG. PROC. 430 (1992); see also Heidenberger, Zur Vollstreckbarkeit von US-Jury-Urteilen
gegen deutsche Hersteller, 36 R1W 804 (1990); Joachim Zekoll, Zur Vollstreckbarkeit eines US-
amerikanischen Schadensurteils, 36 RIW 302 (1990). Compare Judgment of Feb. 6, 1991, Landger-
icht Heilbronn [LG] [Trial Court], 37 RIW 343 (1991), which held enforceable a U.S. $10,000 Puerto
Rican award of damages for pain and suffering for conduct that would not have allowed a claim under
German law.
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In 1989 and 1992, the Oberlandesgericht Munchen (Munich Court of Appeals) 3
held that a U.S. summons for punitive damages awards can be served upon a
German defendant under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters.4 Finally, in June
1992, the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice, or FCJ) issued
the first and extensive opinion in this area of law. 5
In the proceedings the plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and California resident, asked
for enforcement of a California damages award for sexual abuse against the
defendant, a German and U.S. citizen who transferred his residence from Califor-
nia to Germany after a runaway period. The U.S. judgment awarded $260 for
medical expenses, $150,000 for future psychological treatment and placement in
an educational facility, $200,000 for pain and suffering, and $400,000 as exem-
plary and punitive damages. The U.S. court allocated 40 percent of the entire
damages awarded as the plaintiff's attorney's fees. The case in the second instance
had come before the Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf (Diisseldorf Court of Ap-
peals), which held only a certain percentage of the U.S. award of punitive damages
and damages for pain and suffering ($275,325) enforceable. 6 The FCJ held the
sum of $350,260 enforceable, recognizing all types of damages except for punitive
damages. The opinion of the FCJ reads like a handbook on American-German
enforcement of judgments. This article discusses some of the legal problems of
3. Judgment of May 9, 1989, 10 PlXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENS-
RECHTS [IPRAx] 175 (1990), 35 RIW 483 (1989); Judgment of July 15, 1992, 13 ZEITSCHRiFr FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1271 (1992). Parallel judgments by the Frankfurt Court of Appeals [OLG
Frankfurt], Judgment of Mar. 21, 1991, 37 RIW 417 (1991) (no violation of public policy in service
of a U.S. complaint for compensatory damages in the area of environmental liability, where an
extension to punitive damages was feared) and by the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals, Judgment of Feb.
19, 1992, OLG, 38 RIW 846 (1992) (no violation of public policy in service of complaint with
exorbitant, only roughly estimated damages).
4. 20 U.S.T. 361-73, reprinted in GARY B. BoRN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 802 (2d ed. 1992) (App. D).
5. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256 (1992), 45 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr
[NJW] 3096 (1992), BGHZ 118, 312. For an extensive discussion of the judgment, see Hartwin
Bungert, Vollstreckbarkeit US-amerikanischer Schadensersatzurteile in exorbitanter Hohe in der
Bundesrepublik, 13 ZIP 1707-25 (1992) [hereinafter Vollstreckbarkeit]; Hartwin Bungert, Inlandsbe-
zug und Vollstreckbarkeit US-amerikanischer Produkthaftungsurteile, 14 ZIP 815-24 (1993) [herein-
after Inlandsbezug]; see also Rolf A. Schiltze, 39 RIW 139 (1993); Harald Koch, Auslandischer
Schadensersatz vordeutschen Gerichten, 45 NJW 3073 (1992); Erwin Deutsch, Urteilsanmerkung, 48
JURISTENZEITUNO [JZ] 266 (1993); Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability ofAmerican MoneyJudgments
Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 641 (1992); Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in
Germany-The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. CoMp. L. 729 (1992);
Haimo Schaek, Anmerkung, 106 ZEITSCHRiFr FOR ZIVILPROZESS [ZZP] 104 (1993). For the opposite
perspective, see Werner F. Ebke & Mary E. Parker, Foreign Country Money-Judgments and Arbitral
Awards and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: A Conventional
Approach, 24 INT'L LAW. 21 (1990).
6. Judgment of May 28, 1991, 37 RIW 594 (1991).
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the case,7 which are part of what is often referred to as a German-American
judicial conflict.8 An opinion by Lord Denning reflects the European perception
of the American procedural system:
As a moth drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only
get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself; and at
no risk of having to pay anything to the other side .... The lawyers will charge the
litigant nothing for their services but instead they will take 40 percent of the damages,
if they win the case in court, or out of the court on a settlement. If they lose, the litigant
will have nothing to pay to the other side. The courts in the United States have no such
costs deterrent as we have. There is also in the United States a right to trial by jury.
These are prone to award fabulous damages. They are notoriously sympathetic and know
that the lawyers will take their 40 percent before the plaintiff gets anything. All this
means that the defendant can be readily forced into a settlement. 9
For lack of a relevant binational or multinational treaty in German-American
relations, the legal basis for recognition of foreign money judgments in Germany
is section 328(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), which reads in
its current version:
The recognition of a foreign judgment is excluded:
1. if the courts of the state to which the foreign court belongs are not competent
according to the German law;
2. if the defendant, who has not participated in the proceedings and raises this plea, has
not been served with the written pleadings initiating the proceedings in the regular
way or in a timely manner, so that he was not in a position to defend himself;
3. if the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment issued here or with an earlier foreign
judgment subject to recognition or if the proceedings on which it is based are inconsis-
tent with an earlier proceeding here which has become final;
4. if the recognition of the judgment would give rise to a result which is manifestly
incompatible with the basic principles of the German law, especially when the recog-
nition would be inconsistent with the basic rights of the constitution;
5. if reciprocity is not assured.'o
7. For a fuller discussion, see Vollstreckbarkeit, supra note 5 and Inlandsbezug, supra note 5.
8. See DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA (Walther J.
Habscheid ed., 1986) (containing contributions by Stiirner, Lange, and Taniguchi); Max Vollkommer,
Disharmonien und Spannungen im internationalen Rechtshilfeverkehr zwischen den USA und Deutsch-
land (Lustellungen und Ladungen), 80 ZZP 248 (1967); PETER SCHLOSSER, DER JUSTIZKONFUKT
ZWISCHEN DEN USA UND EUROPA (1985); Bdhmer, Spannungen im deutsch-amerikanischen
Rechtsverkehr in Zivilsachen, 43 NJW 3049 (1990); see also Perrott, Obtaining Evidence Abroad:
The Disputed Extraterritorial Reach of Civil and Commercial Litigation Procedure, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 91 (Perrott & Pogany eds., 1988); Fisch, The Influence of
German Civil Procedural Thinking and of the ZPO in the United States, in DAS DEUTSCHE ZIV-
ILPROZESSRECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN 400 (Walther J.
Habscheid ed., 1991).
9. Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733-34 (Eng. C.A.
1982).
10. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF JANUARY
30, 1877, at 84-85 (Simon L. Goren trans., 1990) [hereinafter CCP] (translation with slight modifica-
tions).
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Thus, preconditions for recognition-according to CCP sections 722(1) and
723" also applicable for enforcement-are (1) a final judgment of a national court
in civil matters not void on its face according to the law of the judgment state,
(2) international jurisdiction of the foreign court to be determined by inversely
applying German jurisdictional rules, (3) proper service of summons, (4) no
inconsistency of the foreign judgment with a domestic or a prior enforceable
foreign judgment, (5) no infringement of German public policy (ordre public),
and (6) factual guaranty of reciprocity. 12 In U.S.-German relations reciprocity is
generally guaranteed, especially with respect to California.13 In regard to punitive
damages awards special points of discussion are the required civil character of
the judgment and a violation of German public policy (ordre public).
I. Civil Character of a Punitive Damages Award
Some commentators have argued that a punitive damages award, due to its
general or, in the individual case, predominantly penal character, should be placed
out of the reach of sections 328, 722, and 723 of the CCP presupposing ajudgment
in civil matters. 14 However, the prior question whether to characterize the judg-
ment as civil or penal according to the law of the judgment state, or the recognition
state, or of both-left unanswered by the FCJ-should be resolved by characteriza-
tion according to the law of the recognition state. Consequently, punitive damages
are to be demominated as a civil matter. They are a kind of private penalty,
structurally comparable to contractual penalties. In U.S. proceedings, the award
is generally paid to the plaintiff and not to the state.15 The judgment is not entered
11. Sec. 722(1) CCP: "The judgment of a foreign court shall only be executed if its admissibility
is pronounced by an enforceable judgment." Id. at 202. Sec. 723 CCP:
(1) The execution judgment shall be given without examination of the legality of the decision. (2) The execution
judgment shall not be given before the judgment of the foreign court became final according to the law governing
such court. It shall not be given if the recognition of the judgment is excluded by virtue of § 328.
Id. at 202-03.
12. See generally Dieter Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in
the Federal Republic of Germany, 35 Am. J. COMp. L. 721 (1987).
13. Dieter Martiny, in III/1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS ch. I
annots. 1513-1571 (1984); ROLF A. SCHOTZE, DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHE URTEILSANERKENNUNG
34-157 (1992); Martiny, supra note 12, at 751. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1262 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Kaufmann & Kohler, Enforcement of United States Judgments in Switzerland, 35
WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT [WiuR] 211, 243-44 (1983); FESTSCHRIFr H. NAGEL, supra note 1, at
394-97; Hans-Viggo von Hiflsen, Kanadische und Europaische Reaktionen auf die US "pre-trial
discovery," 28 RIW 537, 550 (1982); Hermann H. Hollmann, Auslandszustellung in US-amerikan-
ischen Zivil- und Verwaltungssachen, 28 RIW 784, 786 (1982); Martiny, supra note 12, at 748;
W61ki, Das Haager Zustellungsabkommen und die USA, 31 RIW 530, 533 (1985).
15. In some states, however, a certain percentage has to be paid to the state or a state institution
to remove the plaintiff's incentive. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1993); see also
Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic
Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 328-29 (1991). In these cases the judgment should be deemed
partially recognizable and enforceable, only the respective percentage to be paid to the state has to
be characterized as a criminal matters judgment.
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into a criminal register, nor is the defendant deemed to have a criminal record.
Private persons initiate and dispose of the proceedings. Civil procedure law, not
criminal procedure law, is applicable in U.S. proceedings.16 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., also denied the
criminal law character of punitive damages and held that the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated. 17 While the FCJ did not decide
the question of characterization, it held that punitive damages awards fall within
the range of civil judgments from the perspective of both the German and the U.S.
legal systems. 18
II. Infringement of German Public Policy
The principal rule of denial of r~vision aufond dominates German recognition
law; that is, the German court may not generally review the foreign judgment on
the merits in application of the law of either the judgment state or the enforcement
state. Exceptions to this principle are, according to CCP section 328(l)(4), viola-
tions of German public policy. This provision presupposes (1) an obvious infringe-
ment of a (2) fundamental rule of German law, (3) which in the individual case
leads to a result that is intolerable, (4) while there are sufficient contacts to the
German forum. Unacceptable deviations from essential and mandatory German
procedural and substantive rules may be distinguished. These preconditions show
that the public policy exception leads only to a very lenient review of the judgment,
which will deny recognition merely in extreme cases.
A. PROCEDURAL PUBLIC POLICY
Before the FCJ decision, much debate focused on whether a U.S. judgment
obtained by using extraterritorial pretrial discovery could be enforced under
German law or violated German public policy.19 Although the narrow and con-
16. The same result is proffered by Haimo Schack, in INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT
annot. 818 (1991); Reinhold Geimer, in ZIVnIROZESSORDIUNG [ZPO] § 328 annot. 77 (Richard
Zller ed., 17th ed. 1991) (similarly Zekoll, supra note 1, at 324); Beucher & Sandage, supra note
1, at 985.
17. 109B S. Ct. 2909, 2912, 2915 (1989); see also United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892,
1903 (1989); Pratt v. Duck, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945); David G. Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 1,
8 (1982); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L. REv.
408 (1967); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 736 (1988 & 1992 Supp.); BERNHARD GROSSrELO, DIE
PRIVATSTRAFE-EIN BEITRAG ZUM SCHUTZ DES ALLGEMEINEN PERS6NLICHKEITSRECHTS 61 (1961).
18. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1266 (1992).
19. See Stiefel & St(irner, supra note 1, at 831-32; Rolf A. Schitze, Die Anerkennung und
Vollstreckbarerklarung US-amerikanischer Zivilurteile, die nach einer pre-trial-discovery ergangen
sind, in derBundesrepublikDeutschland, in FESTSCH uFr STIEEL S. 697 (1987); SCHOTZE, supra note
13, at 168-69; Rolf A. Schuitze, Zur Verteidigung im Beweiserhebungsverfahren in US-amerikanischen
Zivilprozessen, 40 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 633 (1986); Rolf A. Schuitze, Probleme der
Anerkennung US-amerikanischer Zivilurteile in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 33 WM 1174, 1175
(1979) [hereinafter Probleme]; see also Harrold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation,
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trolled rules ofjudicial fact-finding under German procedural law do not recognize
the concept of pretrial discovery, the FCJ was right to deny a violation of manda-
tory German procedural rules, since pretrial discovery does not amount to exces-
sive and illicit exploration, and German law knows equivalent, though more
narrowly tailored, rules of disclosure of information.2" Furthermore, the accep-
tance of a general violation of German public policy would conflict with the intent
of the Hague Evidence Convention,21 to which Germany is party and thus obliged
to support optimal mutual legal assistance.22 An infringement of German public
policy by pretrial discovery measures may only be presumed in a concrete and
exceptional case when (1) extraterritorial application of U.S. law violates German
sovereignty, which presupposes a transgression of the measures of the Hague
Evidence Convention, or when the right of privacy guaranteed in German Basic
Law articles 2(1) and 1(1) is violated by excessive exploration, and (2) the judg-
ment is directly based on it.23
The FCJ rejected the argument that the American rule of CoStS 24 infringed upon
German procedural principles.25 Some German commentators had argued that the
Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1986); BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 4, at 261-334 (1st ed. 1989); David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and
the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. ComP. L. 745 (1986);
Donald R. Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of The
Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465 (1983);
Ernst C. Stiefel & Walter I. Petzinger, Deutsche Parallelprozesse zur Abwehr amerikanischer Beweis-
erhebungsverfahren ?, 29 RIW 242 (1983); Ralph Beckmann, Das Haager Beweisabereinkommen und
seine Bedeutungfllr die Pre- Trial-Discovery, 10 IPRAx 201 (1990); David J. Gerber, Essay, Obscured
Visions: Policy, Power, and Discretion in Transnational Discovery, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 993
(1991).
20. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1261-62 (1992). For German evidence rules see the
overview by Dirk-Reiner Martens, Germany, in OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
IN BUSINESS DISPUTES 41 (Charles Platto ed., 1988); see also Peter Gottwald, Simplified Civil Proce-
dure in West Germany, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 687 (1983); Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German
Civil Procedure 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1958); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner,
Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity with our International Rivals, 13 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 1, 21-25 (1992); Christoph E. Hauschka, Central Issues of Business Litigation in West
German Civil Courts, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 47 (1988).
21. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.
18, 1970 [entered into force for the United States Oct. 7, 1972], 23 U.S.T. 2555, reprinted in BORN
& WESTIN, supra note 4, at 855 (App. H); see also Randall D. Roth, Comment, Five Years After
Aerospatiale: Rethinking Discovery Abroad in Civil and Commercial Litigation Under the Hague
Evidence Convention and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 425 (1992).
22. Cf. PETER HOECHST, DIE US-AMERIKANISCHE PRODUZENTENHAFrUNG 121 (1986); Reiner
Martens, Erfahrungen mit Rechtshilfeersuchen aus den USA nach dem Haager Beweisaufnahme-
Obereinkommen, 27 RIW 725, 729-30 (1981).
23. See also Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1262 (1992); Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note
1, at 830.
24. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975); Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-21 (1967); Thomas D. Rowe,
Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1984).
25. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1262 (1992); see also, e.g., Peter Gottwald, in 1
MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 328 annot. 91 (1992); Zekoll, supra note
1, at 322-23.
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American system provided an incentive for speculative suits due to the lack of
a cost risk for the plaintiff.2 6 Although under German procedural law the losing
party is liable for the prevailing party's attorney fees, in addition to court costs
and its own attorney fees, the FCJ viewed the American rule of costs as a functional
equivalent of the German system of government-funded legal aid for low income
groups. In the author's view, the court's rationale seems odd, since the defendant
lost the case, as is usual in U.S. judgments to be enforced in Germany, and thus
an application of the German rule of cost allocation would have led to an even
greater financial burden for the defendant.
27
B. SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC POLICY
1. Applicability of the Strict Rule of Article 38 of the Introductory Law of the
German Civil Code
In German conflicts of law the highly criticized rule of article 38 of the Introduc-
tory Law to the German Civil Code [ILGCC]2 8 provides that German citizens
shall not be subjected to greater liability under an applicable foreign law than
prescribed by German law. Some have argued that this protection of German
tortfeasors should be also applied in recognition cases, since German public policy
should be indivisible; otherwise ILGCC article 38 might lose its effectiveness,
since plaintiffs could sue abroad and thus avoid the curbing regulation. A further
consequence would be forum shopping: the plaintiff would always sue before the
foreign court of the place of the wrong when the foreign law provided higher
damages. 29 The FCJ correctly held the rigid rule of ILGCC article 38 not applica-
ble in the context of the recognition rule of CCP section 328.30 The public policy
exception of CCP section 328(l)(4) provides a flexible instrument, a more lenient
standard, and by its approach of national (minimum) contacts, 31 avoids the strict
nationality rule of ILGCC article 38. This reading of the public policy exception
is certainly one of the several creditor-prone points of the FCJ's judgment.
26. Probleme, supra note 19, at 1176; Rolf A. Schfitze, Conceptual Differences and Areas of
Potential Collision Between the United States and "Civil Law" Procedure firom the German Perspec-
tive, in LITIGATION OF BUSINESS MATTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE 21, 39-41 (Roger ZAch ed., 1984); see also Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 1, at 831.
27. For a related argument, see Zekoll, supra note 1, at 323.
28. EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [EGBGB].
29. See Haimo Schack, Art. 12 EGBGB in deutschen Urteilsanerkennungs- undRegressverfahren,
35 VEtsR 422,423 (1984); SCHOTZE, supra note 13, at 170-71; FESTSCHRIFr H. NAGEL, supra note
1, at 400; Graf von Westphalen, supra note 1, at 141-42.
30. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1263-64 (1992).
31. For a further discussion of this national contacts requirement, see infra part II.B.3.b. and part
IV.
32. In Judgment of June 22, 1984, BGHZ 88, 17 (24-25), the FCJ had already held ILGCC art.
38 inapplicable to the enforcement of judgments according to the Brussels Judgments Convention
[Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 27, 1968, O.J. (L 304) 777]. For a further discussion of this point of the judgment see Vollstreck-
barkeit, supra note 5, at 1711-14.
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When exclusively applying CCP section 328, every type of damages awarded
has to be examined under the lenient standard within the context of the individual
case and its national contacts to determine any obvious infringement of fundamen-
tal German tort law principles. 33 In this author's opinion, the test of each damages
award is twofold, comprising (1) a primary basis of claim control, which only
damages that do not run completely counter to German tort law standards will
pass, followed by (2) a proportionality control, which checks whether the amount
of damages is excessive, that is, violates the proportionality principle. These two
perspectives may also be inferred from the discussions of the FCJ.
2. Punitive Damages
a. Basis of Claim Control
Punitive damages are most frequently debated in the context of the types of
U.S. damages awards generally viewed as excessive. German tort law does not
recognize punitive damages. However, whether a German court would have
awarded the same damages is irrelevant since ILGCC article 38 is not applicable.
Instead, one must ask whether granting this kind of damages would violate funda-
mental German tort principles. The FCJ identified three main purposes of the
U.S. punitive damages doctrine: (1) punishment, predominantly deterrence;34 (2)
complementing compensation of actual losses the plaintiff is unable to prove or
for which the rules of damages do not provide relief (including expenses of
bringing suit); and (3) revenge and satisfaction for the tort victim. 35 Sometimes
the extraction of the tortfeasor's ill-gotten gains is considered a further partial
purpose of punitive damages,36 comparable to a claim of unjust enrichment in
33. The FCJ also discusses at some length the question of whether the future medical expenses
awarded as part of compensatory damages can be recognized. Although under German law "ficti-
tious" damages can only be recovered as to things, not as to persons, since the victim may not dispose
of the physical integrity (i.e., decide whether to "repair" physical damages or instead keep the
money); this is not presumed to be a fundamental principle of German tort law, thus avoiding an
infringement of German public policy. See Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1264 (1992).
34. Deterrence is sometimes counted as an additional fourth function of punitive damages.
35. Hans Stoll, Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 3, 10-13 (1970); Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 520-24 (1957); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages §§ 733-735 (1988 & 1992 Supp.); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (5th ed. 1984); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common
Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 133 (1982); David G. Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1277-99 (1976); Richard C.
Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation,
74 Ky. L.J. 1 (1985); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L.
REv. 705 (1989); David G. Owen, Comment, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 103 (1982); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages-A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1126-30 (1984); see also 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 29.08 (2d ed. 1990) (deterrence, ineffective public regulation). For
a definition of punitive damages in connection with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), see Molzof
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 715-17 (1992).
36. Toy, supra note 15, at 320-23.
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German law.37 However, the prevailing function of punishment and deterrence38
is obviously contrary to the strictly compensatory German tort law principles that
are grounded on restitution in kind (Naturalrestitution), combined with a limited
restitution of nonmaterial losses. The concept of compensation guides German
law, which is oriented towards the interest of the victim rather than the behavior
of the tortfeasor. 39 Furthermore, German law vests the authority to punish exclu-
sively in the government. 40
Three steps may be distinguished for recognizing punitive damages according
to the FCJ's holding. First, punitive damages awards are not automatically refused
recognition because of their generally prevailing penal and deterrent purposes. 4'
Instead, the award of the individual case has to be checked for its concrete
functions and purposes. Second, as far as punitive damages awards are based
on penal or deterrent principles, they are contrary to fundamental German tort
principles and are nonenforceable. However, as far as the award serves to provide
additional compensation for items left uncompensated, such as satisfaction or
unjust enrichment, in that respect the award is enforceable due to a partial equiva-
lent with German law principles and functions. Third, for a partial recognition of
"nonpunitive" parts of a punitive damages award, the U.S. court must explicitly
identify those functions. Due to the prohibited rivision au fond principle, the
German court may not second guess the implicit motives of the U.S. court.42 The
FCJ did not accept a proposal by commentators Stiefel & Stiimer 43 to generally
and abstractly imply a partial compensatory function of punitive damages of a
certain percentage as fictitious attorney fees. The holding seems to imply that
U.S. attorneys should ask the U.S. court to explicitly identify those parts of the
award that address purposes other than punishment and deterrence," thereby
rendering a punitive damages award partially enforceable in Germany, provided
it passes the proportionality test as well.45
Furthermore, consideration could be given to whether a judgment relying on
37. See also Siehr, supra note 1, at 705.
38. For a comparative analysis of penal purposes in tort law, see Stoll supra note 35; Hans Stoll,
Consequences of Liability: Remedies, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
94-119 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1972).
39. 1 KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS § 27, at 412-25 (14th ed. 1987); HERMANN
LANGE, SCHADENSERSATZ 8-13 (2d ed. 1990); HANS STOLL, BEGRIFF UND GRENZEN DES VERIMO-
GENSSCHADENS (1973).
40. See also Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1268 (1992).
41. Martiny, supra note 12, at 747-48; Zekoll, supra note 12, at 323-30; Hoechst, Zur Versicher-
barkeit von punitive damages, 34 VERsR 13, 17 (1983); Hoechst, supra note 22, at 122.
42. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1267-68 (1992).
43. Stiefel et al., supra note 1, at 796-97; Stiefel & Stfirner, supra note 1, at 837, 840-41.
44. Zekoll thinks that this exception of nonrecognition of U.S. punitive damage awards is of
minor importance, since general jury verdicts do not lay down the basis for the award and jury
instructions probably would not be acknowledged as sufficiently probative. Zekoll, supra note 5, at
657-58.
45. See infra part H.B.2.b.
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a statute that explicitly spells out nonpenal functions of punitive damages (among
others) would suffice. However, such statutes do not appear to set apart specific
percentages of the award. In the case at stake, the California court made no explicit
findings, and separately awarded damages for pain and suffering had already
assumed the function of satisfaction. Therefore, punitive damages were com-
pletely unenforceable.4
b. Proportionality Control
On a second level, fundamental German law standards should control the extent
of the damages. The principle of proportionality (Verhaltnismssigkeitsgrund-
satz), with its three elements that the means must (1) be appropriate (geeignet),(2) have the least restrictive effect (erforderlich) to achieve the legitimate end,
and (3) bear a reasonable relationship to the ends (verhaltnismdssig im engeren
Sinne), is fundamental in all areas of German law and of constitutional ranking. 47
Although the FCJ had already refused recognition of punitive damages as counter
to German public policy on the basis of claim control, it nevertheless discussed
the proportionality aspect.48
The FCJ did not address the question of whether it is advisable and sufficient
to accept the judgment state's standards for proportionality review or whether the
recognition state's (i.e. German) standards should be relied on. Because U.S.
punitive damages are reaching extraordinary amounts, much critical debate in the
United States has addressed the advisability of curbing the amounts. Some states
have placed a cap on the amount of recovery in various forms: such as an absolute
dollar cap, a fixed ratio cap, or a profit extraction cap.49 Although several, if not
most, states lack a relationship formula for compensatory damages versus punitive
damages, although the Supreme Court in the Browning-Ferris case refused to see
in exorbitant punitive damages a violation of the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment,50 and although in the nine months after Browning-Ferris no
46. The FCJ explicitly did not take sides in a law review debate where some commentators
suggested a violation of the prohibition of double jeopardy of German constitutional law (GRUNDGE-
SETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 103(2)(F.R.G.)) by recognizing a punitive damage award. See Zekoll,
supra note 1, at 325-26, 329; Hoechst, supra note 41, at 17. These attempts are not persuasive from
a viewpoint of conflicts of constitutional law and as compared to the U.S. Supreme Court holdings
concerning the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment (discussed supra note 17); for further
discussion see Vollstreckbarkeit, supra note 5, at 1719-20.
47. See also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 53 (1989); Matthias Herdegen, The Relation Between the Principles of
Equality and Proportionality, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 683 (1985).
48. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1268-69 (1992).
49. For a discussion, see Toy, supra note 15, at 331-40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g)
(1992); see also Proposed Civil Justice Reform Legislation: Proposed Legislation: Model State Puni-
tive Damages Act, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1077 (1992). Much more rigid than U.S. law are the prerequi-
sites for awarding punitive damages in New Zealand law, which requires "high-handed contumelious
conduct." See Richard Mahoney, New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Reassessment,
40 Am. J. Comp. L. 159, 167-68 (1992).
50. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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less than six punitive damages awards have exceeded $20 million, 5' hope of
"judicial self-restraint" still exists. Some jurisdictions have court-created or
statutory reasonable proportion requirements, often numerically limiting punitive
damages to three times the amount of compensatory damages. 52 Furthermore, on
November 30, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted for review the TXO
Production Corp. case53 under the due process clause.5 In this author's opinion,
the unusual profile (punitive damages 526 times the amount of compensatory
damages) of the case had made it highly probable that the Supreme Court would
set up some kind of a restriction formula, especially by way of a reasonableness
control."
A proposal in a U.S. student comment for a proportionality standard under the
Eighth Amendment takes into consideration three factors that vary in intensity:
(1) the degree of affluency of the tortfeasor, (2) the degree of culpability of the
tortfeasor, and (3) the extent of the compensatory damages awarded.56 Therefore,
51. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1066 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
52. Cases that require a reasonable proportion between compensatory damages and punitive
damages are, e.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Shuster, 575 P.2d 350 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1978) (U.S. $30,000
punitive damages; U.S. $1 compensatory damages); Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 244 P.2d
764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (reasonable proportion); further cases at 22 Am. JUR. 2D Damages § 811
(1988 & 1992 Supp.); see also Comment, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A
Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAc. L.J. 823 (1978). The three-times rule is in force, e.g., in
Florida, FiA. STAT. ch. 786.73(1)(a) (1991); see also CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1992).
The newest proposals are proffered in Jonathon Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Application
of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage Reform,
40 UCLA L. Rav. 753 (1993).
53. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992); see also High Court
to Take Up Case on Large Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1992, at A2.
54. For discussions of the constitutionality of punitive damages, in particular after Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),
see Alan Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment, and
the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1991); Note, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip: Punitive Damages and the Modem Meaning of Procedural Due Process, 70 N.C. L.
Rav. 1362 (1992); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. Rv. 269 (1983); J. Morris Clark, Civiland Criminal Penalties andForfeitures:
A Frameworkfor Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976); Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note,
United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses,
66 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 112 (1991); Nicholas K. Kile, Note, Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive
Damages: Down But Not Out, 65 IND. L.J. 141 (1989); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive
Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 859 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment
on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. Rav. 139 (1986).
55. After completion of this manuscript, the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision of June 25, 1993,
unfortunately declined once again to curb punitive damages by a specific formula under the Due
Process Clause. Relying on Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), Justice Stevens
emphasized for the plurality opinion that the court " 'need not, and indeed ... cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable
that would fit every case.' "TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 61 U.S.L.W. 4766 (June
25, 1993).
56. Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical
Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 1433, 1448-70 (1987).
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instead of unconditionally rushing to a German reasonableness standard, as the
FCJ did, the structure of CCP section 328(1) and the concept of recognition seem
to require first an examination of the law of the judgment state. Thus, a judgment
of a U.S. state with a reasonable proportion statute or court ruling should pass
untouched. However, applying proportionality to punitive damages might result
in a conflict between the German standard and the U.S. standard. The German
proportionality standard looks to an appropriate, necessary, and reasonable rela-
tion between means (the intensity of the impairment of the victim) and ends (the
sum of compensation); whereas the U.S. rules seem to require a reasonable
proportion between the amounts of compensatory damages and punitive damages.
Stiefel & Stiirner emphasize the decisive fact that the debtor's act touched
foreign territory, and thus they are in principal prepared to accept an excess of
foreign law damages; however, they propose to curb recognition to an amount
double the maximum allowed under German law, with a correction for any differ-
ence in purchasing power. 57 The FCJ seems to take a different approach by
refusing recognition when the amount of punitive damages exceeds the sum of
all compensatory damages.58
3. Damages for Pain and Suffering
a. Basis of Claim Control
On the basis of claim control, damages for pain and suffering are enforceable
because German tort law recognizes a functionally equivalent claim, known as
Schmerzensgeld.59 A claim for Schmerzensgeld relates to compensation and satis-
faction, including mild forms of sanction and prevention.60
b. Proportionality Control
With regard to proportionality control of the amount of damages awarded, the
FCJ emphasizes the function of national contacts (Inlandsbezug). The more in-
tense the contacts of the case are to the German legal order in number and intensity,
the less deviation from the German legal system is tolerated under the ordrepublic
approach. On the other hand, in cases with weak contacts to Germany, the standard
is relaxed, particularly under the proportionality test.
In the case before the FCJ both parties were-at least also-U.S. citizens, the
defendant had a U.S. residence until the U.S. proceeding, and the place of the
wrong was in the United States. Consequently, the court accepted the full extent
of damages for pain and suffering. 6' The appellate court had held that a German
57. Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 1, at 840; Stiefel et al., supra note 1, at 790.
58. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1268 (1992).
59. German Civil Code (GCC) § 847.
60. FCJ Judgment of June 7, 1955, 18 BGHZ 149, 154-57; LANGE, supra note 39, at 435-39;
JOHANNES K6NDGEN, HAFrPFUCHTFUNKTIONEN UND IMMATElUALSCHADEN § 54-104 (1976); Erwin
Deutsch, Haftungsrecht und Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr EDUARD WAHL 339 (1973).
61. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1270 (1992).
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court faced with a similar set of circumstances would have awarded about DM
30,000 and, under the doctrine of proportionality control, held enforceable four
times that amount (DM 120,000 = approximately $75,000).62 In addition, the
FCJ came up with a very strange proposition: the victim's interest in receiving
compensation and satisfaction under his or her domestic standards should set the
primary evaluation for a case with weak forum contacts to Germany.63 From this
seems to follow that an obvious and voluntary subjection to a jurisdiction leads
to a protection of the reliance on that law. This subjectivization of the national
contacts requirement, however, is contrary to the objective concept of public
policy and should be abandoned immediately. The FCJ did not address whether
the affluence of the defendant should be a relevant factor in the proportionality
review. 6 Considering the affluence of a defendant, however, would be contrary
to the principles of German tort law.
4. Contingency Fees
German professional ethics law forbids agreements that make reimbursement
of attorney fees contingent on the outcome of the case. Attorney fees are set up
by law as a certain percentage of the amount in controversy and are to be reim-
bursed by the parties besides the amount awarded according to the outcome of
the case. In previous decisions the FCJ had held that contingency fees violated
the public policy exception of German conflicts of law. 65 The court either did not
allow contingency fees at all or reduced them.6 In the new decision the FCJ did
not view the concept of contingency fees as a violation of German substantive
public policy under CCP section 328(1)(4) and did not place the voidness of
German contingency fee agreements under GCC section 138(1) among the funda-
mental German legal principles.67
The FCJ, then, views proportionality control expansively. It bars recognition
only when, due to the anticipated calculation of the quota of the contingency fee,
the sum awarded by the jury widely exceeds the sum necessary for restitution in
kind.68 This generosity shows the weaker effect of the public policy exception in
recognition of judgments as compared to the conflicts of law public policy excep-
tion. In the view of this author, as already proposed in the context of the nonpenal
function part of punitive damages, 69 a U.S. proportionality or reasonableness
62. Judgment of May 28, 1991, 37 RIW 594, 596 (1991).
63. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1270 (1992).
64. Id.
65. ILGCC art. 30, now art. 6.
66. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1965, 44 BGHZ 183, 188-90; Judgment of Jan. 9, 1969, 51 BGHZ
290, 292-94. However, in the Judgment of Nov. 15, 1956, 22 BGHZ 162, an infringement of German
public policy was denied, but the contingency fees had amounted only to 1.5%.
67. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1264-65 (1992).
68. Id. at 1265.
69. See supra part lI.B.2.b.
WINTER 1993
1088 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
review of the attorney fees as practiced in a few U.S. states7 ° should be given
priority. Absent a U.S. proportionality or reasonableness review, Stiefel &
Stiirner propose a progressive scale of enforceable attorney fees ranging from 30
percent for small amounts in controversy, to 20 percent for moderate amounts in
controversy, to 10 percent for large amounts in controversy.71 However, instead
of concentrating on the extent of the amount in controversy, making enforceable
contingent fees dependent upon the extent of national contacts would be more
consistent with the structure of the public policy exception. In cases establishing
very strong national contacts-probably not yet the typical German-U.S. product
liability case72-the upper limit should be approximately 30 percent.
III. Partial Recognition
On the procedural side, partial recognition of judgments for different claims
or types of damages awarded (for example, damages for pain and suffering, but
not punitive damages) have been generally allowed, although some courts or
commentators have refused partial recognition of judgments for amounts within
a category of damages (for example, 35 percent of damages for pain and suffer-
ing).73 The FCJ explicitly refrained from deciding the question, but some passages
of the decision imply acceptance of this kind of partial recognition.74
This kind of partial recognition should definitely be allowed, since it may be
deduced from the principle of proportionality and its element of the least possible
intervention.75 Partial recognition should be assessed ex officio, with no motion
necessary.76 Otherwise, the plaintiff would have to take a chance as to which
percentage of the claim or award to make a motion for.
IV. Conclusion and Outlook
Although the case before the FCJ concerned an atypical situation, the court
cleared the ground for recognition and enforcement of the much more important
U.S. -German product liability cases. Whether the outcome of the FCJ judgment
will be transferable to those cases will probably depend on the national contacts
criteria,77 which show strongest effects at the level of proportionality control.
70. See cases in 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 295 (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
71. Stiefel et al., supra note 1, at 796-97.
72. See also infra part IV.
73. E.g. SCHIOTZE, supra note 13, at 171; LG Berlin, Judgment of June 13, 1989, 35 RIW 988,
990 (1989); Franz Matscher, Zur Teilanerkennung und zur Teilvollstreckung auslandischer Urteile,
in FESTSCHRIFT 0. REIMER 33, 38-39 (1976) (at least in the absence of a respective motion by the
plaintiff).
74. Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1267 (1992).
75. For further arguments, see Vollstreckbarkeit, supra note 5, at 1724.
76. See also Judgment of June 4, 1992, 13 ZIP 1256, 1269 (1992).
77. Hopefully not the approach of its subjectization, i.e., the reliance of the victim on his or her
domestic law.
VOL. 27, NO. 4
U.S. DAMAGES AWARDS IN GERMANY 1089
Among the relevant contacts are the nationality of the plaintiff and the defendant
(in case of corporations the place of incorporation" or seat), the situs of assets,
the place of the legal transaction (especially the lex loci contractus), the place of
performance or the place of committing, and the place of the effects of the tort.
The concept of national contacts resembles the U.S. concept of the most significant
relationship of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws,7 9 the minimum
contacts standard under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
developed in International Shoe, s° and the interest balancing approach of Tim-
berlane 1 transferred into the so-called "rule of reason" in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 2 The FCJ recently
introduced a similar concept of sufficient national contacts as a restrictive interpre-
tation for jurisdiction based on the presence of property in Germany according
to CCP section 23.83
The typical German-American product liability case, an American consumer
injured in the United States by a product manufactured in Germany and sold
directly or via a U.S. subsidiary by the German manufacturer, has more national
(German) contacts than the rather unusual facts of the FCJ case under discussion
here. On the basis of claim control, however, different outcomes are not likely.
On the proportionality control, on the other hand, due to the intensified national
contacts, German courts should be less willing to accept exorbitant sums of
78. Article XXV(5) of the German-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN
Treaty) of Oct. 29, 1954,7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593,273 U.N.T.S. 3943, is probably relevant
in German-American cases, although German national conflicts of law follow the seat rule. See
Carsten T. Ebenroth, Gaining Access to Fortress Europe-Recognition of U.S. Corporations in
Germany and the Revision of the Seat Rule, 24 INT'L LAW. 459 (1990). However, despite its concept
of national treatment, the FCN Treaty does not set explicit or implicit standards for the recognition
of judgments. See also Inlandesbezug, supra note 5, at 816.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969). As to this concept, see, e.g.,
Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521,
552-62 (1983); LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWs-FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 67-69
(1991); ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 90, at 264-67 (4th ed. 1986).
80. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), as well as Burnham v. Superior Ct., 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). See also HAIMO
SCHACK, JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM CONTACTS SCRUTINIZED 32-74 (1983); LEFLAR ET AL., supra
note 79, § 21, at 49-58; EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.20-.23, at 78-88
(2d ed. 1992); compare also Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 121 (1992).
81. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See
also the application in Timberlane 1, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 749
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), of the seven-factor test developed in Timberlane 1.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1986).
83. Judgment of July 2, 1991, 44 NJW 3092 (1991); compare Reinhold Geimer, Rechtsschutz
in Deutschland kanftig nur bei Inlandsbezug?, 44 NJW 3072 (1991); Gerhard Dannemann, Jurisdic-
tion Based on the Presence of Assets in Germany: A Case Note, [1992141 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 632;
Juirgen Mark & Hans-J6rg Ziegenhain, Der Gerichtsstand des Verm/gens im Spannungsfeld zwischen
Volkerrecht und deutschem internationalen Prozessrecht, 45 NJW 3062 (1992); Martin Fricke, Neues
vom Vermogensgerichtsstand?, 45 NJW 3066 (1992).
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damages. Particularly in products liability cases, a specific concretization of the
proportionality principle and a fundamental rule of German law are to be found
in the Products Liability Act84 section 10(1), which limits damages for personal
injuries per product defect to DM 160 million. Of course, this restriction, particu-
larly for several judgments against the same German manufacturer, will only
come into effect in cases approaching the magnitude of the Bhopal catastrophe.
Finally, this author hopes that the FCJ will accept the priority of a reasonable
proportion test of the judgment state as proposed in this article.85
The recognition and enforcement of a products liability case awarding excessive
punitive damages might come soon. A recent decision of the Oberlandesgericht
Munchen (Munich Court of Appeals) held unfounded a complaint of BMW AG
against the service of summons in accordance with the Hague Service Convention,
BMW AG having argued an infringement of public policy. In the underlying
proceedings the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, meanwhile ordered
BMW AG to pay compensatory damages of $4,000 due to a defect in the coating
of a BMW 535i, as well as punitive damages of $4 million. 6
84. Act Concerning Liability for Defective Products of Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI] 12198, implementing the Council of the European Community's Directive on the Approxima-
tion of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability
for Defective Products of July 25, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 28. For a comparison of German and
U.S. products liability law, see, e.g., Hartwin Bungert, Compensating Harm to the Defective Product
Itself-A Comparative Analysis of American and German Products Liability Law, 66 TUL. L. REv.
1179 (1992).
85. Supra part U.B.2.b. and part lI.B.4.
86. Judgment of July 15, 1992, 13 ZIP 1271 (1992). Probably the U.S. judgment is not yet final.
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